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Abstract
Multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO) continue to spread in hospitals globally, but the population-level impact of
recommended preventive strategies and the relative benefit of individual strategies targeting all MDRO in the hospital
setting are unclear. To explore the dynamics of MDRO transmission in the hospital, we develop a model extending data
from clinical individual-level studies to quantify the impact of hand hygiene, contact precautions, reducing antimicrobial
exposure and screening surveillance cultures in decreasing the prevalence of MDRO colonization and infection. The effect of
an ongoing increase in the influx of patients colonized with MDRO into the hospital setting is also quantified. We find that
most recommended strategies have substantial effect in decreasing the prevalence of MDRO over time. However, screening
for asymptomatic MDRO colonization among patients who are not receiving antimicrobials is of minimal value in reducing
the spread of MDRO.
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Introduction
Multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO), including methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant en-
terococci (VRE) and multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacteria
(MDRGN), continue to spread in hospitals worldwide causing
substantial morbidity and mortality [1]. Limiting the emergence
and spread of MDRO requires a multifaceted approach which
encompasses decreasing MDRO transmission between patients,
limiting inappropriate antimicrobial exposure and reducing
MDRO infections among MDRO-colonized patients [1]. The
population-level impact of strategies targeting all MDRO is
unclear since the great majority of clinical investigations
addressing their efficacy have been individual- or patient-level
studies focusing on a single MDRO pathogen.
The spread of MDRO is a complex system, with numerous
interrelated and dynamic interactions between patients and
healthcare workers (HCW), and therefore focusing on individuals
by themselves or a single type of MDRO provides incomplete
answers. Population-level models, in contrast, relate individuals to
each other and have been instrumental in understanding the
efficacy of preventive strategies targeting numerous infectious
agents, including influenza, HIV and multidrug-resistant tubercu-
losis [2–7]. These mathematical models build upon clinical
individual-level data and characterize the relationship between
individuals and MDRO spread at the population level. Modeling
is therefore a necessary requirement for the extension and
complete analysis of epidemiological data of MDRO, since clinical
epidemiological studies cannot fully capture the complexities of
MDRO spread at the population level. Another inherent
limitation of clinical studies of infectious agents is the assumption
of independence between individuals. Since the spread of MDRO,
by definition, occurs between patients, independence between
individuals cannot be assumed [8]. A comprehensive transmission
model was therefore developed to quantify the population-level
impact of preventive strategies targeting all MDRO, including
MRSA, VRE and MDRGN, using data obtained from clinical
studies and the study hospital. The outcomes of interest were the
overall reduction in the prevalence of MDRO colonization and
MDRO infection.
Mathematical Model
A deterministic differential equations model characterizing the
transmission dynamics of MDRO between patients and health-
care workers in a 600-bed tertiary care hospital in Boston,
Massachusetts, with approximately 40,000 admissions per year
was developed. In the model, hospitalized patients are in 6
mutually exclusive states: colonized with MDRO receiving or
not receiving antimicrobials (CA and CN respectively), not
colonized with MDRO receiving or not receiving antimicrobials
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(SA and SN , respectively), infected with antimicrobial-susceptible
pathogens (IN ) or infected with MDRO (IR). To simplify the
model, the infected and colonized with non-resistant bacteria
were combined. This coupling allowed direct comparisons to the
resistant compartments. Patients enter the hospital in any of the
6 states and leave at a rate of 1/length of average hospital stay
specific for each compartment. Uncolonized patients receiving
antimicrobials become colonized with MDRO through contact
with HCW and move into the MDRO-colonized, on antimicro-
bials, compartment. Healthcare worker interactions are implic-
itly modeled through variations in the transmission rates. It is
assumed that only uncolonized patients receiving antimicrobials
can become colonized with MDRO, since selective pressure on
the patient’s flora from antimicrobial exposure is a prerequisite
for MDRO acquisition [9]. Although this assumption is
theoretically valid, we also simulated the model allowing all
patients to become colonized with the resistant strain regardless
of antimicrobial exposure. The model incorporates the decreased
transmission probability among colonized patients who are not
receiving antimicrobials. In these patients, the absence of
selective pressure from antimicrobials results in lower MDRO
bacterial loads and leads to a lower likelihood of skin and
environmental contamination [10–12]. It was also assumed that
loss of MDRO colonization does not occur during a patient’s
hospital stay since for all MDRO, colonization exceeding the
average length of hospital stay has been well-documented
[13,14]. During their hospital stay, a proportion of uncolonized
and colonized patients develop infections with antimicrobial-
susceptible pathogens and MDRO, respectively. Once antimi-
crobial treatment is completed, patients move back to their
respective uncolonized or colonized, not receiving antimicrobi-
als, compartments (Figure 1). Mathematical equations describing
the transmission dynamics of MDRO are provided in the
Methods section.
Contact precautions (x), which reduce the probability of
MDRO transmission (b), are implemented among patients who
have infections with MDRO and among colonized patients
identified by screening [15]. These contact precautions include
donning gloves and gowns upon entering a colonized patient’s
room to prevent HCW contamination and subsequent MDRO
spread to other patients. Distinct values for screening efficacy
among patients receiving and not receiving antimicrobials were
incorporated into the model (kCN and kCA), since studies have
shown that an increased bacterial load due to antimicrobial
exposure significantly increases the diagnostic accuracy of
screening cultures [10]. Healthcare worker hand hygiene compli-
ance (g) was incorporated into the model transmission rates (see
Methods).
Parameter estimates for the model were obtained from the study
site’s extensive computerized databases of patient admissions,
pharmacy, infection control and microbiological repositories from
January 1st through December 31st, 2009. This real-time web-
based on-line medical record system provides data for all
hospitalizations to the study hospital. Estimates that were not
available from these databases were obtained from a formal review
of the literature (Table 1).
Figure 1. A compartmental model describing the transmission dynamics of MDROs in a 600-bed hospital. The arrows and parameter
values correspond to entry and exit from the 6 compartments (SA-susceptible patients receiving antibiotics, SN -susceptible patients not receiving
antibiotics, IN -patients infected with a non-resistant strain, CA-patients colonized with an MDRO that are receiving antibiotics, CN -patients colonized
with an MDRO not receiving antibiotics, and IR-patients infected with an MDRO). The following parameters were used: 100l, percentage of patients
being admitted to each compartment; 1/c, length of hospital stay; t, rate that patients start receiving antibiotics; n-rate that patients discontinue
antibiotics; a, rate that colonized patients become infected; s, rate that infected patients are successfully treated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030170.g001
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A deterministic model was used and therefore patients were
aggregated into homogenous compartments. Although a stochas-
tic, individual-based model, would consider patient heterogeneity,
the increase in behavioral detail would result in data that are more
difficult to interpret and apply, compared to deterministic models
[16].
Evaluation of strategies
Simulations were performed to quantify the impact of the
following strategies which directly affect MDRO transmission: 1)
improving compliance with hand hygiene; 2) improving compli-
ance with contact precautions; and 3) the impact of screening for
asymptomatically colonized patients among those receiving and
not receiving antimicrobials. Only screening for MRSA and VRE
was incorporated into the model, since there is currently no
standardized method for MDRGN screening. Decolonization
was not addressed in this model since effective decolonization
therapy is only available for MRSA. Simulations were also
performed to determine the contribution of factors which
indirectly impact MDRO transmission: 1) the number of patients
entering the hospital already colonized with MDRO, 2) length of
hospital stay (LOS) of colonized patients and 3) reducing
antimicrobial exposure. Lastly, simulations were also performed
to determine the impact of different transmission rates among
MDRO on the above strategies. The effect of varying the
infection rate among colonized patients on the number was
compared to the increase in number of infections if cross-
transmission was minimized through non-compliance with
preventive measures. The varying rate of infection reflected
measures aimed at preventing the development of nosocomial
infections which have been outlined by the Society for Healthcare
Epidemiology of America [17].
Results
Baseline scenario
Using the baseline parameters (see Table 1), the model predicts
that at steady-state, 24% of patients will be colonized with
MDRO, 2.1% will develop MDRO infections, and 7% will
develop non-MDRO infections. Approximately 5–10% of patients
will develop an infection while in the hospital, with the upper limit
representing hospitals similar to the study hospital, with a
population of patients with a greater severity of illness and
therefore with a higher likelihood of developing hospital-acquired
infections [18]. The baseline model’s estimate of a total of 9.1% of
infections is therefore comparable to published data.
There are approximately ten times more MDRO-colonized
patients than MDRO infected patients in the hospital setting as
shown in several studies [14,19]. The model’s estimates of 24% of
MDRO-colonized patients and 2.1% of MDRO infected patients
are therefore also comparable to published data. Simulations
which allow all patients to become colonized regardless of
antimicrobial exposure, as opposed to only those receiving
antimicrobials, did not change the qualitative results of the
baseline model.
Hand hygiene and contact precautions
The estimated benefits of improving compliance with hand
hygiene and contact precautions in reducing the overall percent of
patients colonized or infected with MDRO are presented in
Figure 2. In figure 3, the change in percent of MDRO-colonized
patients from baseline values is quantified, as compliance with
hand hygiene or contact precautions vary. Improvements in
compliance with hand hygiene from 60% to 80% and from 80%
to 100% decrease the prevalence of colonization by 12% and 8%
respectively, and both decrease the percent of patients with
MDRO infections by 8%. An improvement in compliance with
contact precautions from 60% to 80% and from 80% to 100%
decreases the prevalence of colonization by 10% and 6%
respectively, and decreases the percent of patients with MDRO
infections by 6% and 4%, respectively. These decreases in
infection percent reflect the overall decrease in the total number
of patients colonized with MDRO.
Screening
Screening patients for asymptomatic colonization also reduces
the overall prevalence of MDRO, but only among patients
receiving antimicrobials (Figures 2 and 3). Improving screening
efficacy has less effect on the prevalence of MDRO compared to
improving compliance with hand hygiene or contact precautions,
since a smaller population size is targeted and the model only
incorporates screening for VRE and MRSA, since MDRGN
screening has not been standardized.
Influx into the hospital and LOS of MDRO-colonized
patients
Increasing the influx of MDRO-colonized patients into the
hospital results in a substantial increase in the prevalence of
MDRO-colonized patients over time. Figure 4a shows that
increasing the influx from 10% to 15% to 20% will increase the
percent of MDRO-colonized patients from 24% to 32% to 40%,
respectively. Similar increases in the prevalence of MDRO
occur if the LOS of colonized patients increases from the
baseline of 14 days to 21 to 28 days, resulting in an increase in
prevalence from 24% to 34% to 42%, respectively (Figure 4b).
When comparing the impact of the influx or LOS of MDRO-
colonized patients to the efficacy of prevention strategies directly
affecting transmission in the overall prevalence of MDRO,
Figures 2a, 4a and 4b, demonstrate that increasing the influx to
only 14% or LOS to 18 days results in prevalence values over
30%, which are similar to values when compliance with hand
hygiene or contact precautions are 0% or there is no screening
implemented.
Antimicrobial exposure
At the study hospital, antimicrobials are initiated among 25%
and 15% of MDRO-colonized and uncolonized patients per day,
respectively (Table 1). Increasing the percentage of patients who
start antimicrobials from 0% to 100% results in an overall
increase in MDRO prevalence from 22% to 30% (Figure 4c).
Decreasing antimicrobial exposure has less effect on decreasing
the prevalence of MDRO compared with improving hand
hygiene or contact precaution compliance, since this intervention
only impacts the subset of colonized patients receiving antimi-
crobials.
Varying transmission rates
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the percentage of patients colonized
or infected respectively, as the compliance/efficacy of contact
precautions, screening patients not receiving antimicrobials,
screening patients receiving antimicrobials, and hand hygiene
are varied. The different panels show results for different MDRO
transmission rates. These simulations show that trends remain the
same, but the overall prevalence percentages are amplified for
each strategy as transmission increases. Importantly, the effect of
screening patients not receiving antimicrobials remains minimal,
even for high transmission rates.
Model of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms
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MDRO infection rate among colonized patients
Varying the percent of MDRO-colonized patients who develop
an infection from 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% to 25% over their LOS
results in 12 (2%), 24 (4%), 33 (5.5%), 42 (7%), and 48 (8%) of
hospital-acquired infections, respectively (Figure 4d). These
increases in the number of infections are substantially higher than
if any of the above strategies aimed at decreasing the spread of
MDRO were not implemented (Figures 2b and 4a,b,c).
Basic Reproduction Number
Here we consider the special case where all patients entering the
hospital are not colonized or infected and are not receiving
antimicrobials, that is lSA~lIN~lCA~lCN~lIR~0 and lSN~1.
This is a model with perfect entrance screening. In this case, MDRO
only remain in the hospital indefinitely due to transmission dynamics.
Under this condition, we find analytic formulas for equilibria
(SN ,SA,IN ,CN ,CA,IR) and the basic reproductive number R0.
Solving, we find two equilibria, the uncolonized equilibrium
(SN ,SA,IN ,0,0,0) and the colonized equilibrium (SN ,SA,IN ,
CA,CN ,IR) (see Methods for formulas). The uncolonized equilib-
rium always exists. The uncolonized equilibrium acts like the usual
disease-free equilibrium of epidemic models. Correspondingly, we
find the basic reproductive number, R0. When R0w1, there exists
another equilibrium, the colonized equilibrium, where all
compartments are positive and MDRO exist in the hospital (see
Methods for formulas).
The basic reproductive number for our model is given by
R0~
A
B
, ð1Þ
Table 1. Parameter estimates for the model of transmission dynamics of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO).
Parameter Symbol Baseline Value Source
Percentage of patients admitted per day
- uncolonized receiving antimicrobials 100 lSA 4.5% S, [22–24]
- uncolonized not receiving antimicrobials 100 lSN 80%
- colonized receiving antimicrobials 100 lCA 0.3%
- colonized not receiving antimicrobials 100 lCN 10%
- infected with MDRO 100 lIR 0.2%
- infected with antimicrobial-susceptible bacteria 100 lIN 5%
Length of hospital stay
- uncolonized receiving antimicrobials 1=cSA 10 days S
- uncolonized not receiving antimicrobials 1=cSN 5 days
- colonized receiving antimicrobials 1=cCA 14 days
- colonized not receiving antimicrobials 1=cCN 14 days
- infected with MDRO 1=cIR 30 days
- infected with antimicrobial-susceptible bacteria 1=cIN 10 days
Patients in whom antimicrobials are discontinued per day
- colonized 100 nCA 4% S
- uncolonized 100 nSA 15%
Patients in whom antimicrobials are started per day
- colonized 100 tCN 25% S
- uncolonized 100 tSN 15%
Infected cure rate
- MDRO 100 sIR 65%/LOS [28,29]
- non-MDRO 100 sIN 80%/LOS
Becoming infected rate
- colonized 100 aCA , aCN 5%/LOS [30]
- uncolonized 100 aSA , aSN 5%/LOS [30]
Probability of HCW transmission in contact with
- colonized patients not on contact precautions bCA 0.4 [10,15,31]
- patient with MDRO infection on contact precautions bIR 0.4bCA
- colonized patients not receiving antimicrobials bCN 0.2bCA S
Compliance with hand hygiene or contact precautions 100 g,x 60% [32]
Screening efficacy colonized receiving antimicrobials 100 kCA 90%
Screening efficacy colonized not receiving antimicrobials 100 kCN 50%
S: data was obtained from a real-time web-based on-line medical record system providing information for all hospitalizations to a 600-bed tertiary care hospital from
January 1st through December 31st, 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030170.t001
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where
A~(1{g)tSN (cINzsIN )faCA(bCN (1{kCNx)sIR
zbIR(1{x)(aCNzcCNztCN ))zaCN (bIRnCA(1{x)
zbCAcIR(1{kCAx))z(cIRzsIR)(bCA(cCNztCN )
(1{kCAx)zbCNnCA(1{kCNx))gw0
B~f(aCAzcCAznCA)
(aCNcIRzcCN (cIRzsIR))
z(aCAcIRzcCA(cIRzsIR))tCNg
|f(aSAzcSAznSA)(aSNzcINzsIN )
z(aSAzcINzsIN )tSNgw0:
The parameters for efficacy of hand hygiene (g) and contact
precautions (x) enter R0 only in the numerator. When either
efficacy increases, R0 decreases and the uncolonized equilibrium is
more likely to be stable. For a more complicated example, the
parameters for the efficacy of screening patients also only enter R0
in the numerator. However, our numerical results suggest that
screening patients receiving antimicrobials has a large effect on
reducing colonization and infection with MDRO, whereas
screening patients that are not receiving antimicrobials does not.
The screening parameters (kCN and kCA) enter the numerator of
R0 in the following products
{kCN (1{g)(cINzsIN )tSNxbCN (aCAsIRz(cIRzsIR)nCA)
{kCA(1{g)(cINzsIN )tSNxbCA
(aCNcIRz(cIRzsIR)(cCNztCN )):
Removing all terms in common and these reduce to
ScreenCN : {kCNbCN (aCAsIRz(cIRzsIR)nCA)
ScreenCA : {kCAbCA(aCNcIRz(cIRzsIR)(cCNztCN )):
Figure 2. The percent of patients colonized (A) and infected (B) with an MDRO at one year when the compliance or efficacy of four
interventions are varied. Solid black line (x) - contact precautions, dotted line (kCN ) - screening of colonized patients not on antimicrobials,
dashed line (kCA) - screening of colonized patients receiving antimicrobials, and grey line (g) - compliance with hand hygiene measures. The dots
mark the baseline values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030170.g002
Figure 3. The percentage change from baseline of patients that
are colonized with an MDRO at one year. Grey line - hand hygiene
measure compliance is varied; solid black line - the percentage of
compliance with contact precautions is varied; dashed line - the efficacy
of screening patients receiving antibiotics is varied.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030170.g003
Model of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms
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As screening efficacy increases, both terms become more
negative, therefore decreasing R0. The terms are very similar,
except that the magnitude of the second term is much larger due
to the other terms in the product. Taking the terms in the
productions one at a time, the top term, which includes screening
patients that are not receiving antimicrobials (kCN ), contains bCN
which is one-fifth the size of bCA, which appears in the same place
in the second product. Comparing the next terms aCAsIR versus
aCNcIR, we see that sIR~0:65cIR and aCN~aCA, in both cases
5% of patients that are colonized become infected while in the
hospital. The final difference is between nCA~0:04 in the top
equation and cCNztCN&:32 in the bottom equation. Overall, the
top product has a much smaller magnitude than the bottom
product, and these values are only scaled by the parameter for
screening efficacy. Therefore, increasing the percentage of patients
not receiving antimicrobials that are screened affects R0 much less
than increasing screening of patients that are receiving antimicro-
bials. This analysis mirrors our numerical results.
Discussion
The benefits of recommended prevention strategies aimed at
limiting the spread of MDRO and decreasing the rate of MDRO
infections were quantified using a comprehensive transmission
model. In addition to analyzing the impact of interventions which
directly influence MDRO transmission, the model also quantified
the impact of indirect factors which contribute to MDRO spread.
In contrast to the majority of clinical studies and other models,
this model addressed the transmission of all MDRO, including
MRSA, VRE and MDRGN. The model also evaluated the
efficacy of the most important infection control interventions and
specifically addressed the differences in overall prevalence of
MDRO when screening patients who were or were not receiving
antimicrobials.
First, three interventions which directly reduce MDRO
transmission were compared: 1) hand hygiene, 2) contact
precautions, and 3) screening of asymptomatic carriers. The
model projects a substantial beneficial impact in reducing the
prevalence of MDRO colonization from implementation of
recommended strategies. The extent of reductions in MDRO
prevalence and infections reflects the proportion of patients
targeted by these interventions. Hand hygiene has the most
beneficial effect, as it limits transmission from all colonized
patients, including those that are known and unknown to be
colonized. Contact precautions are slightly less effective, since they
target only those patients known to be colonized through screening
or MDRO identification from clinical cultures. The model
emphasizes that even modest improvements in compliance with
hand hygiene or contact precautions will lead to substantial
decreases in colonization. For example, the model projected that
increasing compliance with hand hygiene or contact precautions
from 60% to 80%, resulted in an overall decrease in the
prevalence of MDRO by 10–12%.
Screening for asymptomatic MDRO colonization also reduced
the prevalence of MDRO among hospitalized patients. However,
screening patients who were not receiving antimicrobials had a
minimal beneficial impact. The explanation for this important
finding is the following. It has been well-documented that selective
pressure from antimicrobials increases the MDRO bacterial load
colonizing patients and that the higher bacterial load leads to
Figure 4. The percent of patients that are colonized with MDRO (black line) or infected with MDRO (grey line) at one year. (A) - the
percentage of patients colonized with MDRO at admission is varied; (B) - the length of stay (LOS) of patients colonized with MDRO is varied; (C) - the
percent of MDRO-colonized patients becoming infected during their stay in the hospital is varied; and (D) - the percent of MDRO-colonized patients
starting antimicrobials per day. The dots mark the baseline values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030170.g004
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greater environmental and skin contamination [10,11]. Converse-
ly, among patients who are not receiving antimicrobials, the
absence of selective pressure results in substantially lower bacterial
loads, leading to minimal environmental and skin contamination.
Thus, patients not receiving antimicrobials contribute only
minimally to the spread of MDRO. Screening this group of
patients would therefore not have a substantial impact on reducing
MDRO spread.
The finding that screening cultures performed on patients who
are not receiving antimicrobials is of limited benefit, has important
implications. It suggests that strategies, which implement screening
cultures only on patients receiving antimicrobials may be
substantially more cost-effective than those implemented on
patients receiving and not receiving antimicrobials. Furthermore,
although the majority of studies have shown benefits to screening
cultures, the degree of benefit varies. There are numerous
methodological issues which can explain the varying degree of
benefit in these studies. The results of this model suggest that
future studies should also evaluate the proportion of screened
patients who are receiving antimicrobials [20,21].
Second, the model evaluated three parameters, which indirectly
influence the transmission rate of MDRO: 1) the percentage of
patients colonized with MDRO at hospital admission, 2) the LOS
among colonized patients and 3) the rate of antimicrobial
exposure. Increasing the number of patients who are colonized
with MDRO at admission or increasing their LOS substantially
increased the prevalence of MDRO in the hospital, reflecting a
larger proportion of patients transmitting MDRO for longer
periods of time. Although the overall percentage of patients
entering a hospital colonized with all the three MDRO under
investigation has not been quantified, studies focusing on
individual types of MDRO have detected up to 10%, 8% and
9% of patients harboring MRSA, VRE and MDRGN, respec-
tively, at hospital admission, with greater percentages if admitted
to the intensive care unit [22–27]. A proportion of these patients
may be co-colonized with more than one MDRO. However these
percentages emphasize the substantial influx of MDRO into the
hospital setting. The model implies that the influx of MDRO into
the hospital setting contributes substantially to the prevalence of
MDRO in the hospital. In fact, increasing the influx of patients
harboring MDRO at admission to 12% or increasing their LOS to
18 days, results in an overall prevalence of MDRO of 30% over
time, a percentage value similar to when compliance with hand
hygiene or contact precautions are 0% or there is no screening. An
increasing reservoir of MDRO through increases in influx or LOS
is also important to address when assessing the efficacy of infection
control interventions. If the reservoir of MDRO increases during
the study period, then the benefits of preventive strategies under
Figure 5. The percent of patients colonized with an MDRO at one year when the compliance or efficacy of four interventions are
varied for four transmission levels. Solid black line (x) - contact precautions, dotted line (kCN ) - screening of colonized patients not on
antimicrobials, dashed line (kCA) - screening of colonized patients receiving antimicrobials, and grey line (g) - compliance with hand hygiene
measures. The dots mark the baseline values. (A) bCA~0:2; (B) bCA~0:4 - baseline value used in other simulations; (C) bCA~0:6; and (D) bCA~0:8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030170.g005
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study may be minimized. The third indirect factor analyzed,
antimicrobial exposure, also reduced the prevalence of MDRO
but less than improving compliance with hand hygiene or
improving compliance with contact precautions. The smaller
beneficial impact of reducing antimicrobial exposure reflects the
size of the population since only colonized patients on antimicro-
bials are targeted.
There are two patient outcomes to consider when addressing
the impact of interventions aimed at limiting MDRO transmis-
sion: colonization and infection. It is important to reduce the
overall colonization prevalence in an effort to decrease the
antimicrobial resistance gene pool within a healthcare setting,
which contributes to endogenous acquisition of antimicrobial
resistance from previously susceptible pathogens and to the
emergence of novel MDRO. Preventing de novo MDRO
colonization is also important as it reduces the number of
patients at risk of developing infections with MDRO, once
colonized. The model demonstrates that the direct interventions
substantially decrease the prevalence of MDRO colonization.
However, their impact on reducing MDRO infections is small,
even when the efficacy of their implementation is at a maximum.
In contrast, when preventing infections is the outcome of interest,
even modest increases in the rate at which MDRO-colonized
patients develop infections substantially negates the beneficial
impact of all the strategies aimed at reducing transmission. For
example, increase the MDRO infection rate among colonized
patients from 5% to 10% results in as many MDRO infections as
would occur if compliance with hand hygiene or contact
precautions was 0%.
This model predicts qualitative trends in MDRO reduction,
consistent with a wide range of baseline parameter values, which
are useful for comparing the efficacy of interventions. The
intention of the model is therefore not to predict precise numerical
values, which can vary between hospital wards and pathogens.
However, the computer programs and numerical simulations
generated by this model can easily be adapted to individual
hospital settings, using their specific data and support from their
information systems. Simplifying assumptions of the model
included the absence of environmental contamination and
endogenous acquisition of antimicrobial resistance among
MDRGN, which should be addressed in future models. Lastly,
the majority of parameter estimates were obtained from one
hospital and thus the results may not be generalizable to other
healthcare settings.
This transmission model provides a comprehensive analysis of
the impact of infection control interventions targeting all MDRO
and extends data obtained from clinical studies by incorporating
the numerous interrelated dynamic factors contributing to the
Figure 6. The percent of patients infected with an MDRO at one year when the compliance or efficacy of four interventions are
varied for four transmission levels. Solid black line (x) - contact precautions, dotted line (kCN ) - screening of colonized patients not on
antimicrobials, dashed line (kCA) - screening of colonized patients receiving antimicrobials, and grey line (g) - compliance with hand hygiene
measures. The dots mark the baseline values. (A) bCA~0:2; (B) bCA~0:4 - baseline value used in other simulations; (C) bCA~0:6; and (D) bCA~0:8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030170.g006
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spread of MDRO, which clinical studies cannot adequately
address. The model also provides important findings that warrant
consideration for future clinical studies addressing the impact of
preventive interventions, including MDRO screening only among
patients who are receiving antimicrobials, and the impact of an
increasing MDRO reservoir in the hospital setting.
Methods
The transmission of antimicrobial resistant bacteria within the
hospital is modeled as a system of ordinary differential equations.
The patient population is separated into six compartments:
susceptible and not receiving antimicrobials (SN ), susceptible but
receiving antimicrobials (SA), colonized with a resistant strain and
not receiving antimicrobials (CN ), colonized with a resistant strain
but receiving antimicrobials (CA), infected with a nonresistant
strain (IN ), and infected with a resistant strain (IR). The size of each
compartmental population changes in time (t), given in days, as
patients transit between states. An initial size for each compart-
ment is given at time zero (t~0).
The system of ordinary differential equations which describe
transition between compartments is
dSA
dt
~L(t)lSA{
(1{g)SA(t)
N
f(1{kCN )bCNCN (t)z(1{kCA)bCACA(t)
z(1{x)(kCNbCNCN (t)zkCAbCACA(t)zbIRIR(t))g
{aSASA{nSASAztSNSN{cSASA
ð2Þ
dSN
dt
~L(t)lSNzsININznSASA{tSNSN{aSNSN{cSNSN ð3Þ
dIN
dt
~L(t)lINzaSASAzaSNSN{sININ{cININ ð4Þ
dCA
dt
~L(t)lCAz
(1{g)SA(t)
N
f(1{kCN )bCNCN (t)z(1{kCA)bCACA(t)
z(1{x)(kCNbCNCN (t)zkCAbCACA(t)zbIRIR(t))g
ztCNCN{nCACA{aCACA{cCACA
ð5Þ
dCN
dt
~L(t)lCNznCACAzsIRIR{aCNCN{tCNCN{cCNCN ð6Þ
dIR
dt
~L(t)lIRzaCNCNzaCACA{sIRIR{cIRIR: ð7Þ
Additionally, we assume that the hospital remains full (at size N)
and therefore the total population size is conserved and one
equation can be removed from the system by letting
SA~N{SN{IN{CA{CN{IR. Therefore, the total rate of
patients entering the hospital at any time is equal to the rate of
patients leaving. The total rate at which patients leave (and
therefore enter) the hospital at time t is given by
L(t)~cSNSN (t)zcSASA(t)zcININ (t)
zcCNCN (t)zcCACA(t)zcIRIR(t),
ð8Þ
where the average lengths of stay of patients are given by 1=cSN ,
1=cSA, 1=cIN , 1=cCN , 1=cCA, and 1=cIR for patients in com-
partments SN , SA, IN , CN , CA and IR respectively.
For each parameter of the model, an independent value
(demarcated by the name of the particular compartment as a
subscript) is assigned to each compartment. Patients can enter the
hospital in any of the six compartmental states. The proportion of
patients entering susceptible and not receiving antimicrobials is lSN ,
susceptible and receiving antimicrobials is lSA, infected with a
nonresistant strain is lIN , colonized and not receiving antimicrobials
is lCN , colonized and receiving antimicrobials is lCA and infected
with a resistant strain is lIR. Patients in SN , SA, CN , and CA
become infected at rates of aSN , aSA, aCN and aCA, respectively.
Patients infected with a resistant strain recover at a rate of sIR and
patients infected with a nonresistant strain recover at a rate of sIN .
Susceptible patients begin receiving antimicrobials at a rate of tSN ,
whereas colonized patients begin antimicrobials at a rate of tCN .
Susceptible patients stop taking antimicrobials at a rate of nSA,
whereas, colonized patients stop antimicrobials at a rate of nCA.
Susceptible patients on antimicrobials become colonized with a
resistant strain through the sum of mass action terms
b(t)~
(1{g)SA(t)
N
½(1{kCN )bCNCN (t)z(1{kCA)bCACA(t)
z(1{x)(kCNbCNCN (t)zkCAbCACA(t)zbIRIR(t))
ð9Þ
where bCN ,bCA and bIR are the transmission rates for patients with
a resistant strain but not on antimicrobials, patients with a resistant
strain on antimicrobials, and patients infected with a resistant strain,
respectively. g describes compliance with hand-hygiene measures;
kCA represents the efficacy of screening for patients on antimicro-
bials, kCN represents the efficacy of screening for patients off
antimicrobials. The parameter x represents the percentage of
compliance with contact precautions for those known to be
colonized or infected with a resistant strain. Another version of the
model which allowed SN and IN patients to become colonized with
the resistant strain was also tested. These patients would become
colonized through the same transmission paths as SA patients, but at
significantly lower rates. Because of the lower rates, the results were
unaffected and the simpler model was chosen for clarity.
For each set of parameters and initial conditions, a unique
solution exists and remains nonnegative because the system is
quasi-positive. All numerical simulations resulted in solutions that
tend toward equilibria. In general, analytic formulas for the
equilibria are unknown. While the entrance parameters (l) are
nonzero, resistant strains will remain endemic, since there is
always a source of colonized patients entering the hospital.
Consider the special case where lSA~lIN~lCA~lCN
~lIR~0 and lSN~1. Setting all derivatives equal to zero and
applying the conservation condition, the system can be written in
terms of CA and SA:
IR~
aCN CNzaCA CA
sIRzcIR
ð10Þ
CN~
nCA(sIRzcIR)zsIRaCA
aCNcIRz(tCNzcCN )(sIRzcIR)
CA ð11Þ
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IN~
aSASAzaSN (N{SA{CN{CA{IR)
aSNzsINzcIN
ð12Þ
SN~N{SA{IN{CA{CN{IR ð13Þ
c1SAzc2 CAzc3SA CA~{tSNN
sINzcIN
aSNzsINzcIN
ð14Þ
c4 CA{c3SA CA~0, ð15Þ
where
c1~{
(aSAzcSAznSA)(aSNzcINzsIN)z(aSAzcINzsIN)tSN
aSNzcINzsIN
v0,
c2~{
1
(aSNzcINzsIN )(aCNcIRz(cIRzsIR)(cCNztCN ))
((cINzsIN )(aCN (cIRznCA)
z(cIRzsIR)(cCNznCAztCN )
zaCA(aCNzcCNzsIRztCN ))tSN )v0
c3~c5(1{g)((kCNx{1)aCAbCNsIR
z(x{1)aCA(bIR(aCNzcCNztCN ))
zaCN (bIRnCA(x{1)zbCAcIR(kCAx{1))
z(cIRzsIR)(bCA(cCNztCN )(kCAx{1)
zbCNnCA(kCNx{1)))v0
c4~{
(aCAzcCAznCA)(aCNcIRzcCN (cIRzsIR))z(aCAcIRzcCA(cIRzsIR))tCN
aCNcIRz(cIRzsIR)(cCNztCN )
v0
c5~
1
N(aCNcIRz(cIRzsIR)(cCNztCN ))
w0:
Solving, we find two equilibria, the uncolonized equilibrium
(SN ,SA,IN ,0,0,0) and the colonized equilibrium (SN ,SA,IN ,
CA,CN ,IR). Letting c6~tSNN(cINzsIN )=(aSNzcINzsIN )
w0, the uncolonized equilibrium is (SA,CA)~({c6=c1,0). Since
c1v0, the uncolonized equilibrium always exists. Plugging these
values into equations (10)–(13) gives the values for SN ,IN ,CN and
IR. Since CA~0, CN~0 and IR~0. Therefore, in the
uncolonized equilibrium, there are no patients colonized or
infected with MDRO. The uncolonized equilibrium acts like the
usual disease-free equilibrium of epidemic models. Correspond-
ingly, we find the basic reproductive number, R0. When R0w1,
there exists another equilibrium, the colonized equilibrium, where
all compartments are positive and MDRO exist in the hospital.
The colonized equilibrium has (SA,CA)~(c4=c3,{(c6c3z
c1c4)=(c2c3zc3c4)). SN ,IN ,CN and IR can once again be found
by plugging these values into equations (10)–(13). The basic
reproductive number is given in the Results section.
Simulations indicate that when R0v1, the uncolonized
equilibrium is stable and the uncolonized equilibrium does not
exist (R0v1u{(c6c3zc1c4)v0). When R0w1, the uncolonized
equilibrium is unstable and the colonized equilibrium exists and is
stable (R0w1u{(c6c3zc1c4)w0). Our numerical results can be
viewed through the lens of the basic reproductive number. Each
parameter in the model either increases or decreases R0. By
analyzing how changes in a parameter affect R0, we can determine
how the corresponding treatment affects the long term existence of
MDRO in the hospital.
All analysis was performed using (Mathematica, Wolfram
Research, Cambridge MA). Graphs were produced using
MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA).
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